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HAMASAKI

[L. A. No. 22006.

v.

FLOTHO

In Bank.

[39 C.2d

Oct. 9, 1952.]

TOSHIO HAMASAKI, a Minor, etc., et al., Respondents, v.
FRED W. FLOTHO, SR., et al., Appellants.
[1] New Trial-Award as to Part of Issues.-Although the granting of a new trial limited to the issue of damages rests primarily in the discretion of the trial court, it is an abuse of
discretion to grant such a new trial if the question of liability
is close, if the damages awarded are grossly inadequate, and
if there are other circumstances which indicate that the verdict was the result of prejudice or an improper compromise.
[2a, 2b] !d.-Award as to Part of Issues.-An order granting
plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the single issue of damages in an automobile accident case will be reversed where the
evidence was conflicting as to the negligence of defendant
driver and the contributory negligence of a plaintiff almost 6
years old who was struck by the automobile on crossing a
street; where a verdict of $1,000 allowing only $182.90 for
general damages was inadequate compensation for brain concussion, a broken clavicle, various skull fractures and other
injuries sustained by him; and where other circumstances, such
as the trial judge's proposal to allow $6,682.90 for general
damages if defendants would consent thereto, indicate that the
verdict was the 'result of an improper compromise.
[3] !d.-Award as to Part of Issues.-A new trial limited to the
damages issue may be ordered by the trial court when it can
reasonably be said that the liability issue has been determined
by the jury;
[4] !d.-Award as to Part of Issues.-Gross inadequacy of unliquidated general damages awarded by a jury is usually convincing evidence that it failed to make a decision of the liability issue, so as to render improper the granting of a new
trial limited to the damages issue.
[5] !d.-Award as to Part of Issues.-Generally it is only when
the verdict allows a substantial, even though inadequate,
amount for general damages that it can reasonably be concluded that the jury's error related solely to the damages
issue.
[6] Appeal-Review-Final Judgment.-An order denying a motion for new trial may be reviewed only through an appeal
from the judgment.

[1] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 16; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 21.
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] New Trial, § 15.1; [6] Appeal and
Error, § 1039; [7] New Trial, § 253; [8, 10-12, 14] New Trial, § 15;
[9] Appeal and Error, § 1004; [13] New Trial, § 225.
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[7] New Trial-Appeal-Disposition.-On appeal from an order
granting a motion for a limited new trial, the appellate court
has jurisdiction to do no more than the trial court itself could
have done.
[8] !d.-Award as to Part of Issues.-A party seeking relief in
the trial court by way of a new trial may ordinarily seek a
retrial only of the issues on which the decision has been adverse to him.
[9] Appeal-Review on Appeal from Part of Judgment.-In case
of partial appeals the court may review as much of the judgment as is necessary to give appellant the relief he seeks, even
though it is necessary to reverse parts of the judgment with
which he has no quarrel and from which neither party has
appealed.
[10] New Trial-Motion for Limited New Trial-Powers of Court.
-When the issues of liability and damages are so interwoven
that a new trial limited to damages alone would be unfair to
defendant, the trial court may order a complete new trial
although the only moti0n is by plaintiff for a limited new trial.
[11] !d.-Motion for Limited New Trial-Powers of Court.-It is
not necessary to limit the jurisdiction of the trial court in
passing on a motion for a partial new trial to prevent a complete new trial in case neither party wants it; if defendant
does not wish a new trial he need not move for one, and if
plaintiff does not wish a complete new trial, if he cannot have
a partial new trial, he need simply say so.
[12] !d.-Motion for Limited New Trial-Powers of Court.-The
1929 amendment of Code Civ. Proc., § 657, relating to powers
of trial court on motion for new trial, does not prevent the
trial court from ordering a new trial on all issues when the
motion is limited to the single issue of damages.
[13] !d.-Procedure-Powers of Court on Ruling on Motion.-Although the application of an aggrieved party is a jurisdictional
requirement for new trial proceedings in California, there is no
direct suggestion in Code Civ. Proc., § 657, that the trial court,
in correcting the error complained of, is limited to the method
specified in the application.
[14] !d.-Purpose of Amendment of Code Provision.-Changes in
1929 amendment of Code Civ. Proc., § 657, were intended to
relate solely to subject matter of § 662, empowering the court
to amend the findings and judgment, and were not designed to
alter the jurisdictional effect of a motion for new trial. (Disapproving Quevedo v. Sttperior Court, 131 Cal.App. 698, 21 P.2d
998, insofar as it holds to the contrary.)
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 535; Am.Jur., Appeal
and Error, § 822.
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County granting a new trial on the issue of damages
only. Harold B. ,Jeffery, ,Judge. Reversed with directions.
Parker, Stanbury & Reese and Raymond G. Stanbury for
Appellants.
Culbert L. Olson, John H. Carter and Richard C. Olson
for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Toshio Hamasaki was struck by
an automobile driven by defendant Fred Flotho, Jr. 'l'he
latter was acting in·the course of his employment by defendant Leland and was using the car with the consent of its
owner, defendant Fred Flotho, Sr. Toshio and his father
brought this action to recover for injuries and medical expenses.
The accident occurred in a residential neighborhood while
Toshio, who was then not quite 6 years of age, was crossing
the street in the middle of the block. At the trial plaintiffs
contended that the defendant driver was traveling at an excessive rate of speed and was not maintaining a reasonable
lookout for pedestrians. Defendants contended that the driver
was not speeding and that plaintiff suddenly darted from
behind a parked truck into the path of the automobile. Although it was conceded that Toshio was severely injured, the
extent of his injuries was contested.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs for
$1,000. Defendants' motion for a new trial was denied. Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only was
granted after defendants refused to consent to a judgment
of $7,500. Defendants have appealed from the order granting plaintiffs' motion. There is no appeal from the judgment.
Defendants do not claim that the damages awarded by the
jury are adequate. It is their position that the jury compromised the liability issue and that liability was therefore
never determined. They suggest even that the verdict is ''less
than a compromise,'' that is, that the jury concluded defendants were not liable but nevertheless, out of sympathy,
allowed plaintiffs approximately the amount of the special
damages.
[1] Although the granting of a new trial limited to the
issue of damages rests primarily in the discretion of the trial
court, it is an abuse of discretion to grant such a new trial
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if the question of liability is close, if the damages awarded are
grossly inadequate; and if there are other circumstances that
indicate that the verdict was the result of prejudice or an
improper compromise. (Leipert v. Honold, ante, p. 462 [247
P.2d 324].)
[2a] (1) Evidence of liability. The accident took place on
Carmelita Street in Los Angeles. The pavement is 30 feet
wide and has no center line. There are houses on most of
the adjoining lots, but no sidewalks. Between the pavement
and the houses on each side of the street there is a dirt
shoulder. Immediately before the accident Toshio was walking south on the east shoulder. A truck was parked on the
shoulder in the middle of the block, approximately 195 feet
south of the nearest intersection. A witness saw Toshio pass
the truck on the side away from the pavement and then turn
around it into the street. At that moment this witness looked
away and did not see the accident. The defendant driver
was also proceeding south on Carmelita. He testified that he
was driving at 20 to 25 miles per hour. Other witnesses variously estimated his speed at from 35 to 60 miles per hour
but they all testified that he stopped within 50 feet beyond
the point of impact. Just before the accident he had moved
into the east half of the street to pass around another truck
parked partially off the pavement on the west side. Photographs of his skid marks indicate that at the point of impact
he had returned to the west side ; his left skid mark passed
over a manhole cover in the center of the street. He testified
that Toshio suddenly ran into his path from behind the truck
when only 15 feet in front of the moving car and that it was
then impossible to avoid the accident. Toshio did not testify.
In view of the residential character of the neighborhood,
the testimony that the driver was traveling 60 miles per hour
would fully justify the conclusion that he was negligent, but
the opposing evidence was also ample to uphold a contrary
finding. It is apparent that the jury faced a difficult task
in resolving this question.
(2) Inadequacy of danwges. Plaintiffs' special damages
were stipulated to be $817.10. Thus the award of $1,000 allowed only $182.90 for general damages.
When taken to General Hospital immediately following
the accident, Toshio was not expected to live. He was unconscious for several days. His injuries included brain concussion, a complete fracture of the collarbone, and several
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fractures of the skull. Three of the skull fractures were extensive; one of them resulted in a separation of almost half
an inch and a depression of almost one-quarter of an inch.
'!'here were two puncture wounds in the forehead, the coverings of the left eyeball were swollen, and the pupils were unequal. There was also a bilateral ankle clonus. This much
was not contested. In addition there was medical testimony
that as a result of the accident Toshio was suffering from
permanent psychomotor epilepsy and that he would require
continuous medical care throughout the remainder of his
life. This latter evidence, however, was disputed by defendants' medical experts. Toshio 's teachers were in disagreement
as to whether or not he had made a substantial recovery insofar as his school activities were concerned.
Even if the jurors rejected the evidence of permanent injury, it is inconceivable that they regarded $182.90 as adequate compensation for the brain concussion, the broken
clavicle, the various skull fractures, and the other injuries
admittedly sustained. The conclusion is inescapable that the
verdict was not the result of an effort to assess the pecuniary
value of Toshio's suffering. Had the jury truly believed that
defendants were liable, the verdict would have been for many
times this amount.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that whenever the jury allows
full compensation for special damages and any amount, no
matter how small, for general damages, the trial court's decision to allow a limited new trial will not be reversed on
appeal. Such a view offers the convenience of a mechanical
formula, but it ignores the principles that govern the granting
of partial new trials. [3] A new trial limited to the damages issue may be ordered by the trial court when it can
reasonably be said that the liability issue has been determined
by the jury. [4] A refusal to allow for undisputed special
damages is usually convincing evidence that the jury failed
to make a decision of the liability issue, and that circumstance
has therefore been stressed in a number of appellate opinions.
(See Wallace v. Miller, 26 Cal.App.2d 55, 56 [78 P.2d 745];
Donnatin v. Un1:on Hardware & Metal Co., 38 Cal.App. 8, 11
[17 5 P. 26, 177 P. 845] . ) In a particular case, however, gross
inadrquacy of unliquidated general damages may be just as
convincing. Thus, in fHrnmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 571 [97
N.E. 102, Am1.Cas. 1912D 588], it was held that a verdict of
$200 for the loss of an eye was a conclusive indication that
the jury had compromised the issues of liability and damages.
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(See, also, Schuerholz v. Roach, 58 F.2d 32, 34 [$625 for loss
of eye] ; Keogh v. Maulding, 52 Cal.App.2d 17, 21 [125 P.2d
858] [verdict for $291.23 more than undisputed damages].)
[5] As a general rule, it is only when the verdict allows a
substantial, even though inadequate, amount for general damages that it can reasonably be concluded that the jury's error
related solely to the damages issue. (Hughes v. Schwartz, 51
Cal.App.2d 362, 368 [ 124 P .2d 886 J ; JJ1 eN ear v. Pacific Gr·eyhqnnd Lines, 63 Cal.App.2d 11, 16 [146 P.2d 34] .) In view of
Toshio 's serious injuries, $182.90 cannot be regarded as substantial.
Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal.2d 668, 675 [107 P.2d 614], does not
conilict with the foregoing authorities. In that case the error
necessitating a new trial directly involved the trial court's instructions regarding damages. Moreover, the evidence of defendant's liability was "overwhelming." The new trial was
therefore limited to the damages issue even though, as to one
of the plaintiffs, the jury had awarded less than the undisputed special damages. (See, also, Crandall v. McGrath, 51
CaLApp.2d 438, 440-442 [124 P.2d 858]; Loughran v. McKenna, 60 R.I. 453, 457 [199 A. 302] ; cf Keogh v. Maulding, 52
Cal.App.2d 17, 21-22 [125 P.2d 858] .) In the present case
the jury was properly instructed concerning damages and the
issue of liability was close, so that the grossly inadequate
award cannot reasonably be explained as a mere error of the
jury in the assessment of damages.
[2b] (3) Other cir·cumstances indicating compromise. The
order granting plaintiffs' motion for a limited new trial provided that if defendants would consent to a judgment of
$7,500, the motion would be deemed denied. This proposal
of the trial judge thus allowed $6,682.90 for general damagesmore than 36 times the $182.90 allowed in the verdict. The
great disparity between the jury's determination and that of
the judge provides an additional and striking· ind1cation that
the jurors could not agree on the liability issue and that those
who believed defendants were liable consented to inadequate
damages in return for the votes of those who had decided that
defendants should pay nothing.
Our conclusion that the verdict was the result of an improper compromise necessitates a reversal of the order granting a limited new trial.
Plaintiffs contend that in the event a limited new trial is
denied them they should be given a new trial on all issues.
Unquestionably plaintiffs have been prejudiced by the jury's
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inadequate award, and they would ordinarily be entitled to a
reversal of the judgment on that ground. Defendants urge,
however, that under the special circumstances of this appeal we
have no jurisdiction to do more than affirm or reverse the
trial court's order and that we cannot direct a complete new
trial.
[6] No appeal lies from the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for new trial; that ruling may be reviewed only
through an appeal from the judgment. (City of Los Angeles v.
Glassell, 203 Cal. 44, 46 [262 P. 1084] ; Litvinuk v. Litvinuk,
27 Cal.2d 38, 42 [162 P.2d 8] ; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 80 Cal.
App.2d 378, 384 [182 P.2d 258] .) Defendants have not appealed from the judgment, and, since timely notice of appeal is
a jurisdictional requirement (Estate of Hanley, 23 Cal.2d 120,
122 [142 P.2d 423, 149 A.L.R. 1250] ), we are without jurisdiction to review the judgment or the denial of defendants'
motion.
[7] The only appeal before us is that from the order
granting plaintiffs' motion for a limited new trial. In disposing of this appeal we have jurisdiction to do no more than the
trial court itself could have done. (See Tomales Bay Oyster
Corp. v. Superior Cm&rt, 35 Oal.2d 389, 392 [217 P.2d 968];
Crescent Feather Co. v. United Upholsterers' Union, 153 Cal.
433, 434 [95 P. 871]; Byxbee v. Dewey, 128 Cal. 322, 326 [60
P. 847] ; Wheeler v. Bolton, 92 Cal. 159, 167 [28 P. 558] ; Bloxham v. Tehama County Tel. Co., 29 Cal.App. 326, 340 [155 P.
654] .) The controlling question, therefore, is whether or not
the trial court, on plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the issue
of damages only, had power to grant a new trial on all issues.
This question is analogous to that presented when an appeal
is taken from only a part of a judgment. To simplify litigation a party who is aggrieved by a judgment is ordinarily
entitled to limit his appeal to the parts thereof with which
he is dissatisfied. [8] Similarly, when he is seeking relief
in the trial court by way of a new trial, he ordinarily may
seek a retrial only of the issues on which the decision has been
adverse to him. In either case, however, situations may arise
where the issues are so interwoven that a partial retrial would
be unfair to the other party. When, as in the present case,
for instance, the jury has, by compromising the issues of
liability and damages, inextricably interwoven those issues,
a retrial of the damages issue alone based on the erroneous
assumption that defendant's liability has been determined
would be extremely unjust to him. A situation is thus pre-
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sented where the plaintiff has been aggrieved, but the specific
relief he seeks may not be granted without doing an injustice
to the defendant. Since the relief requested may not be
granted, the trial court, if the issue is presented by motion
for a limited new trial, or the appellate court, if the issue is
presented by a partial appeal, must do one of two things. It
must either deny all relief, or order a new trial on both issues.
[9] In the case of partial appeals it is settled that the court
may review as much of the judgment as is necessary to give
the appellant the relief he seeks even though it is necessary
to reverse parts of the judgment with which he has no quarrel
and from which neither party has appealed. (Milo v. Prior,
210 Cal. 569, 571 [292 P. 647] ; Blaal~e v. BLac;he, 37 Cal.2d
531, 538 [233 P.2d 547] ; Americ;an Enterprise, Inc;. v. Van
Winkle, ante, p. 210 [246 P.2d 935]; Bailey v. Bailey, 60 Cal.
App.2d 291, 293 [140 P.2d 693].) [10] Logically the same
rule should govern the trial court when passing on a motion
for a limited new trial.
[11] It is suggested that in a particular case both parties
may prefer the judgment as originally entered to the expense
and uncertainty of a new trial on all issues, and that therefore
the trial court should not have jurisdiction to grant a complete
new trial in the absence of a motion therefor. There is no
reason why, if a limited new trial cannot be granted, the
parties should not be allowed to adopt the jury's compromise
as their own. In such a case, however, the trial court would
undoubtedly respect their preference in this respect and deny
any new trial at all. (Of., Leipert v. Honold, ante, p. 462
[247 P.2d 324] .) Accordingly, it is not necessary to limit
the jurisdiction of the trial court in passing upon a motion
for a partial new trial to prevent a complete new trial that
neither party wants. If the defendant does not wish a new
trial he need not move for one, and if the plaintiff does not
wish a complete new trial, if he cannot have a partial new
trial, he need simply say so.
On its face, however, a motion for a limited new trial gives
no inkling that the plaintiff would prefer no new trial to a
complete new trial. Before such a preference could be inferred
it would be necessary to assume his knowledge of a rule that
the trial court could only grant or deny the motion as made.
To adopt such a rule would thus create a procedural trap for
those unwary of the niceties of practice, who, following the
natural instinct to ask only for what they wished would dis39 C.2d-20
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cover they could receive nothing because they asked for too
much. It is no answer to say that the plaintiff could extricate
himself from this trap by appealing from the judgment after
his motion for a limited new trial was denied. The power of
the appellate court to reverse a judgment because of the
inadequacy of the damages is much more limited than that
of the trial court to grant a new trial for the same reason, and
thus in most cases the plaintiff must secure relief from the
trial court if he is to secure it at all.
[12] Defendants contend, however, that by amending section 657 of the Code of Civil Proceure in 1929, the Legislature
adopted the rule that a trial court may not order a new trial
on all issues when the motion is limited to the issue of
damages alone. Although this contention is supported by
Quevedo v. Superior Court, 131 Cal.App. 698 [21 P.2d 998],
the court in that case did not consider the analogous rule
applicable to partial appeals, and we have concluded that its
interpretation of the amendment to the statute was erroneous.
Before 1929, section 657 read: "The former verdict or other
decision may be vacated and a new trial granted, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes,
materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:
. . . . '' After the amendment of that year the section read:
''The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be
modified or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further
trial granted on all or part of the issues, on the application of
the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially
affecting the substantial rig·hts of such party: . . . . "
The principal changes effected by the amendment were the
addition of the words "modified," "in whole or in part," and
"on all or part of the issues." Since it had earlier been held
that a new trial could be limited by the trial court to particular issues, it was said in the Quevedo case that the purpose
of the amendment could not have been merely to authorize
such limited new trials and therefore must have been to
restrict the trial court's jurisdiction to the exact terms of the
motion.
The statutory language itself does not expressly refer to
jurisdiction and by no means compels the conclusion that the
Legislature meant to affect jurisdiction. [13] Although the
application of an aggrieved party is a jurisdictional requirement for new trial proceedings in California (Tabor v.
Sitperior Court, 28 Cal.2d 505, 507 [170 P.2d 667]; Prothero
v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 439, 444 [238 P. 357] ; Ransome-
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fJrummey Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393, 398 (205 P.
446]; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Dev. Co., 171 Cal.
173, 194 [152 P. 542] ; Kohlstedt v. Hauseur, 24 Cal.App.2d
60, 64 [74 P.2d 314] ), there is no direct suggestion in the
statute that the trial court, in correcting the error complained
of, is limited to the method specified in the application. If
the limited new trial sought would be prejudicial to the opposing party, the granting of a complete new trial is the most
reasonable response to the motion. Moreover, if the language
of section 657 is interpreted to restrict the trial court's power
to either granting or denying a request for a limited new trial,
then logic dictates that the statute should also be interpreted
to restrict the trial court's power to either granting or
denying a request for a complete new trial. The power of the
trial court, however, to limit a new trial to particular issues,
even when the motion was for a complete new trial, has not
been questioned and was expressly recognized in the Quevedo
case itself.
[14] An examination of the legislative history of section
657 shows that the purpose of the amendment of 1929 was
unrelated to the jurisdictional question here presented. The
changes in section 657 were effected by section 2 of chapter
479 of the Statutes of 1929. Section 7 of chapter 479,
enacted on the same day, added the following new section to
the Code of Civil Procedure : '' § 662. In ruling on such
motion, in a a cause tried without a jury, the court may, on
such terms as may be just, change or add to the findings,
modify the judgment in whole or in part, vacate the judgment, in whole or in part, and grant a new trial on all or part
of the issues, or, in lieu of granting a new trial, may vacate
and set aside the findings and judgment and reopen the case
for further proceedings and the introduction of additional
evidence with the same effect as if the case had been reopened
after the submission thereof and before findings had been
filed or judgment rendered. Any judgment thereafter entered
shall be subject to the provisions of sections 657 and 659 of
this code.''
Section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a general
section giving the trial court authority to review its own
judgments and setting forth the grounds on which review is
to be made. Before 1929, such authority was limited to granting new trials, but in that year the Legislature gave the trial
court, in nonjury cases, the alternative power of modifying
its judgments. To this end, section 662 was added to the
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code, setting forth in detail the procedure for nonjury cases.
An important purpose of the new section was the granting of
authority to make partial changes in findings and judgments,
and the words "modify," "in whole or in part," and "on
all or part of the issues'' were used to describe that authority.
Since section 662 is concerned with a special application of the
general power of review conferred by section 657, rewording
of section 657 was also necessary to make it conform to the
new procedure for nonjury cases. 'l'hus it was provided that
decisions other than verdicts could be "modified" "in whole
or in part" and new trials gran ted "on all or part of the
issues.'' 'l'his phraseology is identical with that used in the
newly added section 662. It is clear that the changes in section
657 were intended to relate solely to the subject matter of
section 662 and were not designed to alter the jurisdictional
effect of a motion for new trial. To the extent that the Quevedo case holds to the contrary it is disapproved.
The order granting a new trial on the issue of damages only
is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with
directions to vacate the judgment and order a new trial on
all issues.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the judgment. As I understand the rule now stated and applied, a plaintiff under the
circumstances here shown may not, by limiting the scope of
his motion for a new trial, restrict the action of the court in
ruling upon it.
However, the language of the opinion is inconsistent with
the decision. It is said: "[I] f the plaintiff does not wish a
complete new trial, if he cannot have a partial new trial, he
need simply say so.'' Where is he to ''say so''? Is he to state
in his notice of motion that he is moving for a new trial on
the issue of damages only? Or is he to ''say so'' in the presentation of the motion?
In either event, what is the purpose of stating to the court,
either in writing or orally, that the plaintiff does not wish
a complete new trial if the statement is of no legal effect?
The rnle nbw laid clown is that, in the situation shown by
the present record, a plaintiff may not limit the action of the
trial judge in ruling upon his motion. To suggest that, in
some manner not specified, a plaintiff may make his wishes
known to the court which is under no duty to consider them,
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is to add confusion to procedure and uncertainty in regard
to the respective rights of the parties.
Also, the court points out that, by compromise, the parties
may wish to stand on the judgment. In that event, why should
there be any motion for a new trial? ·The obvious rule that
parties to litigation may stipulate to the amount of a judgment needs no judicial recognition or approval.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The order granting plaintiff a new trial on the issue of
damages should be affirmed. The trial court has exercised its
discretion and determined that the evidence on liability was
clearly sufficient (it denied defendants' motion for a new
trial) and also that a limited new trial (damages only) was
proper and not unjust to defendants-that there was no indication of a compromise verdict by the jury. I have discussed that phase of this case in my dissent in Leipert v.
II onold (ante, p. 471), and here adopt the views expressed
there.
There is an additional factor here presented. The sole
appeal was from the order granting plaintiffs a limited new
trial ; no appeal was taken from the judgment. The majority
opinion nevertheless reverses the entire judgment on the
ground that the issue of liability and damages are inseparable. With that I disagree. Indeed, this court held in
Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal.2d 1 [187 P.2d 752], that it was
error to admit evidence of liability where defendant admitted
he was liable· for the injuries suffered by plaintiff but denied
the amount of damages claimed. Hence, the holding in the
Fuentes case was not only that liability is severable from damages but it is error for the court to fail to treat it so. We
have a similar question here, because by not appealing from
the judgment, defendant is now in the position of admitting
liability. The similarity between the rule in the Fuentes
case and granting a new trial on the issue of damages alone
was pointed out in Tumelty v. Peerless Stages, 96 Cal.App.
530, 535 [274 P. 430], where the court was discussing the latter question : "It is not at all rare or unusual for defendants
in negligence cases to concede liability at the outset of a trial
and to put before the jury the single question of the extent
of plaintiff's damage. On principle there would seem to be
no difference between the elimination of the issue of negligence
by voluntary act of the defendant, and its elimination by the
trial jttdge after the defendant has had his day in court on
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such isstte, and the trial judge, who has heard all the evidence, has become convinced that nothing could be gained
by relitigating that issue, and,no prejudice suffered by not
relitigating it." (Emphasis added.)
It has been held repeatedly that in personal injury and
wrongful death actions the issue of liability is severable from
the issue of damages, and a new trial on the latter issue alone
is proper. (Tumelty v. Peerless Btages, supra, 96 Cal.App.
530; Cox v. Tyrone Power Enterp1"t.ses, Inc., 49 Oal.App.2d
383 [121 P.2d 829] ; Bmnnan v. Ban Fr·ancisco, 42 Oal.App.2d
144 [108 P.2d 989] ; Amore v. Di Resta, 125 Oal.App. 410 [13
P.2d 986]; Brush v. K~wstin, 11 Cal.App.2d 258 [53 P.2d
777] ; Bellman v. Ban Francisco H. S. D1:st., 11 Oal.2d 576
[81 P.2d 894]; Hoffart v. Southern Pac. Co., 33 Cal.App.2d
591 [92 P.2d 436] ; Crandall v. McGrath, 51 Cal.App.2d 438
[124 P.2d 858]; Adams v. Hildebrand, 51 Cal.App.2d 117 [124
P.2d 80] ; Rigall v. Lewis, 1 Cal.App.2d 737 [37 P.2d 97] ;
Henslee v. Fox, 25 Oal.App.2d 286 [77 P.2d 307].) As said
in Bauman v. San Francisco, s1tpra, 42 Oal.App.2d 144, 160:
"In its brief it is argued that the question of damages is 'so
interwoven with the question of liability that the issues should
not be segregated.' 'fhe issue of liability is clearly severable
from the issue as to the amount of damage. The two issues
are in no way connected. Since 1929, section 657 of the Code
of Civil Procedure has expressly authorized the trial court
in a proper case to grant a new trial on the issue of damages
alone." (Emphasis added.) And the same is true where there
is a reversal on appeal where the basis therefor goes to the
damage question only. (Southern Pac. 111£1:ll. Co. v. Billiwhack,
etc. Farm, Ltd., 50 CaLApp.2d 79 [122 P.2d 650] ; Moeller v.
Market St. Ry. Co., 27 Oal.App.2d 562 [81 P.2d 475] ; Bellman
v. San Francisco H. S. Dist., 11 Cal.2d 576 [81 P.2d 894] ;
Pretzer v. California Transit Co., 211 Cal. 202 [294 P. 382] ;
Paul v. Williams, 64 Cal.App.2d 696 [149 P.2d 284] ; Brewer v.
Second Baptist Church, 32 Oal.2d 791 [197 P.2d 713] ; B1:shop
v. Kelley, 100 CaLApp.2d 775 [224 P.2d 814] ; Hollywood
Cleaning & P. Co. v. Hollywood L. Service, Inc., 217 Cal.
131 [17 P.2d 712]; 5 O.J.S., Appeal & Error,§ 1935.)
In an endeavor to escape the effect of the holding in these
cases the majority opinion attempts to sidestep them by saying
the jury has "inextricably interwoven those issues "-liability
and damages. Although the jury instructions do not appear
in the record they undoubtedly included the standard instruction that the jury was to give no consideration to the question
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of damages until it had found liability.. (See Cal. Jury Instructions, B.A.J.I., Instructions Nos. 112, 113, 114.) And
that damages could not be allowed unless there was liability.
It is presumed that the jury followed those instructions. (2
Cal.Jur. 871; 24 Cal.Jur. 795-796.) A jury may be said to
have disregarded the instructions only in the event that the
evidence does not support the verdict. (Cornrnonwealth Bonding etc. Co. v. Pacific Elec. R. Co., 42 Cal.App. 573 [184 P. 29] ;
Fidelity&: Casualty Co. v. Llewellyn Iron Works, 42 Cal.App.
766 [184 P. 402]; 24 Cal.Jur. 796.) Hence, there is no basis
for the conclusion that the verdict was a compromise, and, as
pointed out in my dissent in Leipert v. Honold, ante, p. 471
[247 P.2d 324], that issue was resolved in accordance with
the presumption by the trial court.
While the majority accuse the jury of compromising the
issue of liability in this case, in my opinion the majority of
this court is guilty of rendering a decision based upon a compromise, in the decision it has rendered today in this case.
It will be remembered that in a former decision in this case the
majority of this court held that since there was no appeal from
the judgment this court was without jurisdiction to review
the judgment and was limited to a consideration of defendant's appeal from the order of the trial court granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only.
It thereupon reversed this order which meant that the judgment of $1,000 was reinstated and plaintiff had no further
opportunity to obtain redress for the injuries suffered by
him as the result of the negligence of the defendant. (See
[Cal.] 240 P .2d 298.)
In my dissent to the former decision of this court in this
case I stated: "In view of the foregoing, for this court to
find the trial court guilty of an abuse of discretion in granting
a new trial on the issue of damages only, and reverse the
order, thus entitling the defendant to recover his costs on
appeal, with no opportunity for the plaintiff to ever retry
the case or obtain further redress, is, to my mind, not only
unsound from the standpoint of legal reasoning, but is so
cruel and inhuman as to shock the sense of justice of all who
may read the majority opinion." ( [Cal.] 240 P.2d 303.)
A petition for rehearing was filed by plaintiff and a rehearing· was granted by vote of the following members of this
court: Chief Justice Gibson, Justice Shenk and myself. Justice
Edmonds being absent from the state, Justice Dooling of the
First Appellate District was assigned to sit in his place, and
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Justice Dooling also voted for a rehearing. Justices Traynor,
Schauer and Spence all voted against the granting of a rehearing. Anticipating that plaintiff's petition for a rehearing
would be denied, I prepared a dissenting opinion which I
intended to file upon the entry of the order of denial which
was as follows :
''I dissent from the order denying a rehearing in this case
and feel constrained to write an opinion expressing my views
because of certain points raised in Respondent's Petition for
Rehearing which were not discussed in either the majority or
dissenting opinions now on file.
"Respondent's Petition for Rehearing calls attention to the
fact that the judgment, entered in the trial court, conclusively
established the liability of the defendant, and is now final
since no appeal was taken therefrom and is res adjudicata on
the issue of defendant's negligence and the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. In other
words, there is a final judgment which establishes defendant's
liability for the injuries suffered by plaintiff and the majority
opinion holds that there is ample evidence to support this
judgment. The only appeal in this case is from the order
granting plaintiff's and respondent's motion for a new trial
on the issue of damages only. This presents a question as to
the scope of review of this court on the appeal from such order.
It appears to be the settled rule that in reviewing an order
of this character the only issue involved is one of damages;
that is, the amount to which plaintiff is entitled in view of
the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by him, the
extent of the disability, if any, which will result from such
injuries and the amount necessarily expended and which he
will be required to expend in the future because of such
injuries as disclosed by the evidence. Upon a consideration
of this evidence this court must determine whether or not the
trial court abused its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion
for a new trial on the issue of damages only. Since the judgment established the liability of the defendant for plaintiff's
injuries and no appeal has been taken from the judgment, this
court has no power to review the issue of liability as that issue
is not before this court on this appeal. The defendant, by
not appealing from the judgment, is conclusively presumed
to be satisfied with it and his only concern is the retrial of
the issue of damages.
"This proposition is clearly stated in 2 Cal.J ur., page 828.
'Upon an appeal from an order upon a motion for a new trial,
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when allowed, the appellate eourt is limited in its review of the
action of the trial court to the grounds upon which such a
motion was based, and upon which the new trial was asked in
the particular case. The sole object of an appeal from an
order granting a new trial is to determine whether the court
erred in granting the motion on the record made up by the
moving party, in respect to any one or all the grounds stated
in the specifications presented by the moving party. And
nothing can be considered on the appeal that does not go to
show that a re-examination of fact is necessary for the protection of the rights of the appealing party. This precludes
a review of errors apparent upon the face of the judgmentroll, such as, for example, the insufficiency of the complaint
or findings to support the judgment.' This proposition is
not discussed in the majority opinion and it is evident that
those who concurred the.rein did not give consideration to
respondent's contention that the issue of liability was settled
by the final judgment, and therefore, the scope of the review on
the appeal from the order granting the motion for a new
trial on the issue of damages only is limited to matters relating to that issue.
"Obviously, the plaintiff would not appeal from the judgment as it was in his favor on the only issues which were
determined by it after the entry of the 9rder granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only.
The defendant was the only party aggrieved by the judgment
as it determined that defendant was guilty of negligence
which was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff and established defendant's liability for such injuries.
''The theory of the majority opinion is that the order granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages
only must be reversed because the jury failed to determine
the issue of liability. The logical result of this reasoning is
that the judgment is void because the issue of liability was
not determined, and therefore, no valid award of damages
could be made. However, the settled rule is that the issue of
liability can only be reviewed upon an appeal from the judgment, and if no appeal is taken, and the judgment becomes
final, it is res adjudicata and cannot be collaterally attacked.
The majority holding in this case amounts to a collateral
attack upon the judgment. To be logical, the majority should
order the judgment set aside and vacated as no amount of
damages can be awarded unless the liability of the defendant
is first established.
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''The foregoing is the only reasonable and logical deduction which can be made from the reasoning of the majority
in this case although the majority opinion does not consider
the case from this point of view.
"The patent error on the face of the majority opinion is
that it treats defendant's appeal from the order granting
plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages
only the same as if defendant had appealed from the judgment. An appeal from the judgment would confer upon this
court jurisdiction to review the issue of liability also. This
was the situation in the cases where the appellate court
reviewed both issues and gave consideration to the question as
. to whether the inadequacy of the award of damages was the
result of a compromise of the issue of liability. Here the
issue of liability was determined by the verdict and is now
set in concrete by the finality of the judgment. This issue
cannot now be reviewed and the judgment is not subject to
collateral attack under any rule of law that can be found in
the books. The majority squarely holds that the order of the
trial court denying defendant's motion for a new trial can
be reviewed only on an appeal from the judgment, and since
no appeal was taken from the judgment, this court is without
jurisdiction to review the judgment or the denial of defendant's motion. Yet the majority proceed and review the only
issue determined by the judgment-the issue of liability-and
holds that such issue was not determined properly because it
was the result of a compromise. In other words, the majority
does that which it says this court has no jurisdiction to do.
What more could the majority have done on an appeal from
the judgment~ It has reviewed the evidence of negligence
and contributory negligence and holds that these issues were
properly submitted to the jury and that the evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict in favor of plaintiff. For all that
appears there were no other issues of fact or law except the
issue of damages. It would seem that the majority has
resorted to double talk in a vain attempt to sustain its unsound
position.
''The majority opinion contains the following statement :
([Cal.] 240 P.2d 302.) 'If the plaintiff prefers a new
trial on all issues to none at all, he can move for a complete
new trial and in his argument on the motion urge the trial
court to limit the new trial to the question of damages; or he
can make an alternative motion, asking for a limited new
trial and if that cannot be granted for a complete new trial.'

Oct.l952]

HAMASAKI V. FLOTHO

619

[39 C.2d 602; 248 P.2d 910]

The reasoning of the majority in the foregoing statement is
somewhat obscure, as the majority does not attempt to point
out how the plaintiff could be benefited by making a motion
for a new trial on all issues if the court should grant the
motion on the issue of damages only and the defendant should
appeal from the order granting such limited new trial. Certainly, the scope of review would not be enlarged because the
plaintiff made his motion for a new trial on all issues. It is
the scope of the order of the trial court granting the motion
for a new trial which determines the scope of review on appeal.
The quoted statement from the majority opinion can afford
little solace to a plaintiff who has been awarded a new trial
on the issue of damages only and this court sees fit to reverse
such order as it did in this case.
"It seems both unfortunate and unwise to me to permit the
ill-considered, illogical, unsound and unjust majority opinion
to stand as a precedent to confuse, mislead and befuddle trial
judges, lawyers and litigants, so long as the majority of this
court blindly persist in perpetuating such an erroneous
pronouncement.''
Of course, the foregoing dissent was not filed because a
rehearing was granted.
It now appears to me that in order for the majority to avoid
the shocking injustice which would result from its former
decision, it has rewritten its decision on a theory entirely out
of harmony with every other decision on the subject, and
by implication, at least, has overruled numerous cases without
even citing them. At this point I cannot refrain from remarking that this practice is entirely out of harmony with my idea
of how to run a court and develop a system of jurisprudence.
It seems to me that if the majority decision is to stand, a
trial judge, in considering a motion for a new trial on the
ground that the damages awarded are either inadequate or
excessive, must weigh the evidence on liability and base his
conclusion as to the adequacy of the damages awarded on the
strength or weakness of the evidence of liability. In other
words he should be clairvoyant to the extent of ascertaining
how much the verdict was increased or decreased by the evidence on the issue of liability. Every lawyer or judge who
has tried a damage suit knows this cannot be done. But the
majority of this court can look at a cold record and say just
what took place in the jury room. At least, that is what the
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majority has done in these four cases.* The position of the
majority would amuse those who have had experience in the
trial of jury cases if it were not fraught with such dire
consequences in the administration of justice. We are supposed to have a judicial system which reposes broad discretion in our trial judges. It has been said that they are something more than referees or umpires. The decided cases
generally hold that in the conduct of a trial the opinion of a
trial judge as to the effect on the jury of instructions of the
court and remarks of counsel are controlling on an appellate
court. In fact, in the very field here involved, the discretion
of the trial judge has been upheld in all but four cases with
the exception of these four cases. And, as pointed out in my
dissent in Leipert v. Honold, ante, pp. 471, 474, the rule here
announced is based upon statements contained in decisions
which did not purport to review the exercise of the discretion
of a trial judge in granting a new trial on the issue of damages only, but where a new trial had been denied and the
appellate court was asked to reverse with directions to retry
the issue of damages only. The majority seize upon these
statements and ignore. all that is said in the decisions upholding the discretion of the trial judge in granting such limited
new trial of which there are 27 according to my research (see
ante, pp. 474, 475).
While the theory upon which the majority decision is based
does not require it, the majority has seen fit to change the
settled rule that a trial court may not grant a complete new
trial when a limited new trial only is demanded (see Quevedo
v. Superior Court, 131 Cal.App. 698 [21 P.2d 998] ). It will
be remembered that both the appellant and respondent took
the position at the oral argument of this case that the Quevedo
case is sound law, and I am unable to follow the reasoning of
the majority in holding that a new trial may be granted on
grounds other than those upon which the motion is made.
Aside from the basic unsoundness of this holding, the mischief
which may flow therefrom staggers the imagination. While
conceding, as it must, that a notice of intention to move for
a new trial is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial
court to grant a motion for a new trial, the majority, by a
peculiar process of reasoning seem to hold that because a
trial court could grant a limited new trial in a case where
*Leipe1·t v. Honold, ante, p. 462 [247 P.2d 324]; Ca1·y v. Wentzel,
ante, p. 491 [247 P.2d 341]; Rose v. Melody Lane, ante, p. 481
[247 P.2d 335].
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a complete uew trial is demanded, it should have power to
grant a complete new trial where a limited new trial is
demanded. 'l'his is tbe equivalent of saying that although a
notice of intention to move for a new trial specifies only one
ground for the motion, the court may grant it on all the statutory grounds. 'l'his is contrary to every decision on the
subject of new trials. (See Sitkei v. Frimel, 85 Cal.App.2d
335 [192 P.2d 820]; Jeffords v. Young, 197 Cal. 224, 228 [239
P. 1054] ; Smith v. Ibos, 22 Cal.App.2d 551 [71 P.2d 847] ;
Polk v. Boggs, 122 Cal. 114 [54 P. 536]; Laver v. Hotaling,
115 Cal. 613 [47 P. 593] ; Estudillo v. Security Loan etc. Co.,
158 Cal. 66 [109 P. 884]; Strange v. Strange, 23 Cal.App. 281
[137 P. 1104]; Johnston v. Blanchard, 16 Cal.App. 321 [116
P. 973] ; Cooper v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.App.2d 336 [55
P.2d 299]; 20 Cal.Jur. 162-163.) In Watkins v. Ntdting, 17
Cal.2d 490, 499 [110 P.2d 384], this court said: "A notice of
intention to move for a new trial upon one or more of the
grounds specified in the Code of Civil Procedure is essential
to the court's jurisdiction. (Smith v. Ibos, 22 Cal.App.2d 551
[71 P.2d 847]; Peters v. Anderson, 113 Cal.App. 158 [298 P.
76].)"
Obviously a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages
only would have to be made upon the ground that the evidence
was insufficient to support the award of damages. (See Leipert v. Honold, ante, p. 471.) The defendant comes into
court to oppose this motion and learns for the first time that
the court intends to hear argument in support of a motion for
a complete new trial on all statutory grounds or on some
other ground than that specified in the notice. He would
justly have cause for complaint, and he would be supported
by all of the decided cases. But if the majority opinion here
is permitted to stand, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
will have any idea as to what might happen when a notice
of intention to move for a new trial on a limited issue is filed.
This is not and should not be the law.
I have hereinbefore stated that the majority are guilty of
rendering a compromise decision, and I think I have demonstrated the truth of that statement. The majority opinion
holds, contrary to all the decided cases, that evidence of
liability may be considered in determining the adequacy of
the award of damages; that a complete new trial on all issues
may be granted when a new trial is demanded on a limited
issue only (likewise contrary to all decided cases) ; that although no appeal is taken from a judgment which establishes
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liability and it has become final, the judgment may nevertheless be reviewed and reversed on an appeal from an order
granting a new trial on the issue of damages only. It is
obvious that the foregoing unsound pronouncements are made
in order to enable the majority to sustain its unsound position
that the trial judge committed a gross, manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for
a new trial on the issue of damages only, and at the same
time to give plaintiff an opportunity to seek redress for his
patently serious injuries. In other words, the majority is
compromising on the law in order to give plaintiff an opportunity to retry his case and probably obtain a fair award of
damages. While I commend the majority for this display
of human kindness, I cannot yield to a compromise which
will necessarily throw the law into a state of confusion,
especially when full justice may be accomplished by following
settled rules of law.
I would affirm the order.
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